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Economic theory explains the supply of volunteering alternatively as an ordinary consumer good or an 
investment one. This paper provides a simultaneous approach considering both the objectives, by 
using the psychological distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, in order to reconcile 
conflicting  results  reported  in  the  literature.  According  to  the  simultaneity  approach,  the  paper 
develops  a  theoretical  model  of  unpaid  labour  supply  within  an  agent’s  two-period  utility 
maximization  problem,  taking  into  account  the  role  of  psychological  motivation.  The  theoretical 
findings are tested with a sample selection model for Italy, by using 1997 Multipurpose Households 
Survey  on  everyday  life  issues  of  Istat.  Robustness  analysis  and  endogeneity  test  for  intrinsic 
motivation are also performed. Empirical analysis rejects the hypothesis that only a consumption or 
investment motive could explain Italian volunteers’ behaviour, supporting the hypothesis that both 
motives  interact in  shaping  regular  unpaid  labour  supply,  with  a  stronger  impact of consumption 
motives. The relevant variables for frequently supplied unpaid labour are intrinsic motivation, age, 
household income, family responsibilities and activity sector. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing share of unpaid labour supply characterises advanced economies, especially in 
the sectors related to education, health and social services. In Italy, in the late nineties, the non 
profit sector was 3.1 percent of the whole economy, with 2.3 percent of total employment. 
Three million workers were employed in non profit activities at zero wages, about one third of 
them were in activities concerning education, health and social services (Beraldo and Turati, 
2007). 
Many studies have attempted to explain unpaid labour supply using two approaches: one 
based on a consumption hypothesis, the other on an investment perspective. In the private 
consumption model, volunteers are motivated to give by themselves, as in the “warm glow” 
literature  (Andreoni,  1990).  In  the  investment  approach,  volunteering  improves  human 
capital, increases employability and future income (Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987). Though 
empirical evidence often supports both approaches, theoretical models do not consider the 
two motives simultaneously. Furthermore, few studies use a social preferences framework to 
analyse unpaid labour supply. According to Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), a person exhibits a 
social preference system if he cares not only about his own welfare but about that of others 
too. Social preferences have been classified as a category of intrinsic motivation (Meier and 
Stutzer,  2008),  which  occurs  when  people  engage  in  an  activity,  with  no  other  external 
incentive than the activity itself (Deci, 1971). 
Following Menchick and Weisbrod (1987), the paper provides a theoretical model and an 
empirical investigation on unpaid labour regularly supplied in non profit organisations. The 
focus  is  on  the  decision  about  how  much  to  volunteer  and  not  on  the choice  whether  to 
volunteer or not. In this way, we can investigate the role of intrinsic motivation when the 
consumption and the investment motive are simultaneously modelled.  
The contribution to existing literature is threefold. First, to the best of our knowledge, the 
simultaneity between investment and consumption motives in shaping unpaid labour supply, 
taking into account also the role of intrinsic motivation, has not been modelled theoretically in 
previous  studies.  Second,  we  study  the  impact  of  family  care  responsibilities  on  the 
determination of unpaid labour supply. Third, the specific activity sector a person is engaged 
in is also investigated as suggested by Freeman (1997, S158).  
Empirical evidence based on the dataset Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie, Aspetti della 
Vita Quotidiana for 1997, run by the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT), is obtained   4 
with a sample selection model. Results show that both investment and consumption motives 
interact in shaping unpaid labour supply, with a stronger impact on consumption purposes. 
Indeed, controlling for a set of observable individual characteristics and for endogeneity bias, 
intrinsic  motivation,  age,  household  income  and  family  care  are  significant  variables  in 
influencing the probability of supplying regular unpaid labour. Moreover, the activity sector 
in which one exerts unpaid labour is also a relevant variable.  
In the following Section, literature about volunteering is resumed, while, in Section 3, the 
theoretical model is described. After a brief presentation of the data set (§4), Sections 5, 6 and 
7 contain econometric analyses. The last Section concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Evidence on unpaid labour supply is not always decisive on some issues. Volunteering can 
be conceived either as consumption or investment good: income and age are thought to be 
relevant  to  distinguish  one  from  the  other.  Where  income  is  concerned,  Menchik  and 
Weisbrod (1987), Day and Devlin (1996) and Vaillancourt (1994) show that a consumption 
motive exists. The same occurs for Italian data in Fiorillo (2009). Searching for a life cycle 
pattern in volunteering decisions, Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), Day and Devlin (1996), 
Vaillancourt  (1994),  and  Fiorillo  (2009)  find  that  age  has  a  significant  impact  on  the 
probability to engage in unpaid work, supporting the investment model. The opposite occurs 
in Brown and Lankford (1992). Two recent papers investigate the problem arising from the 
potential  simultaneity  between  investment  and  consumption  motives.  Prouteau  and  Wolff 
(2006) find some evidence for the consumption model in a French volunteers’ dataset, but 
they  refer  only  to  volunteers  with  positions  of  responsibility.  Hackl  et  al.  (2007),  using 
Austrian data, give stronger support to the investment hypothesis, for employed sole wage 
earners. Though accounting for potential simultaneity in empirical investigation, both papers 
do not supply a simultaneous theoretical analysis. 
Cappellari and Turati (2004)
1, Cappellari et al. (2007) and Carpenter and Myers (2010) 
explicitly introduce intrinsic motivation among variables influencing volunteers’ behaviour. 
Three categories of intrinsic motivations were identified by Meier and Stutzer (2008).  
                                                 
1 Cappellari and Turati (2004) identify intrinsic motivation from a question in which individuals are asked to 
rank a set of “values”. Intrinsic motivation is a dummy which equals 1 for individuals who ranked “solidarity” as 
the most important value.  
   5 
1) Volunteers benefit from intrinsic work  enjoyment. Strictly following the psychological 
definition, ‘to be intrinsically motivated means to engage in an activity because the activity 
itself is interesting and enjoyable’ (Deci et al., 2008, 11), whereas behaviour motivated by 
extrinsic  motivation  ‘entails  doing  an  activity  because  it  leads  to  some  outcome  that  is 
operationally  separable  from  the  activity  itself.  That  is,  extrinsic  motivation  concerns 
activities enacted because they are instrumental rather than because one finds the  actions 
satisfying in their own right’ (Deci et al., 2008, 12). 
2) The warm glow. An impure form of altruism is what Andreoni (1990) defined the warm 
glow,  to  point  out  that  people  are  often  “motivated  by  a  desire  to  win  prestige,  respect, 
friendship, and other social and psychological objectives” (Olson, 1965).  
3) Social preferences. Social preferences implies that an individual has as objective not 
only his welfare but the other people’s welfare too (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002) and can be 
interpreted as a category of intrinsic motivation.  
With  data  referred  to  Italian  volunteers,  Cappellari  et  al.  (2007)  show  that  attending 
religious celebration (as proxy of altruism and “warm glow motivations) has a significant 
impact on time donations. Carpenter and Myers (2010), using data on volunteer firefighters in 
Vermont, prove that altruism, measured by the experimental results of a dictator game, is 
positively  associated  with  the  probability  of  becoming  a  volunteer  firefighter.  Meier  and 
Stutzer  (2008)  analyse  the  relation  between  life  satisfaction  and  volunteering,  measuring 
intrinsic motivation with the relative importance people assign to intrinsic goals (family and 
friends) compared to extrinsic goals (career and income) in life satisfaction. They find that 
both  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  motivations  explain  unpaid  labour  supply,  but  only  intrinsic 
motivation has a positive impact on life satisfaction. Authors suggest that “more research is 
needed in order to better understand which volunteer tasks are most rewarding and how such 
differences can be explained” (Meier and Stutzer, 2008, 55). 
Some papers focus on female volunteers. Carlin (2001), Mueller (1975) and Schram and 
Dunsing (1981) show ambiguous results on the relevance of consumption and investment 
motivations in unpaid female labour supply, using data from US. Some important variables 
could be omitted in both empirical and theoretical investigation, when coping with female 
behaviour.  In  particular,  the  female  propensity  to  take  on  household  duties  could  justify 
different choices in volunteer labour. The presence of young children or elderly needing care 
influences  the  amount  of  voluntary  labour  supplied  because  the  need  for  care  within  the   6 
family modifies the opportunity set available to the volunteer (Taniguchi, 2006; Cappellari et 
al., 2007).  
Freeman (1997) shows  that volunteers have individual characteristics correlated  with a 
higher opportunity cost of time, with respect both to the choice whether to volunteer or not 
and how many hours to supply: they are characterised by higher hourly wages, income, age 
and  education.  Economic  rationale  explaining  this  evidence  is  that:  "volunteers  do  very 
different  things  [  …]  Perhaps  differences  in  the  productivity  of  time  spent  in  voluntary 
activities can help identify supply responsiveness in volunteering” (Freeman, 1997, S158). 
The specific activity sector one is engaged in could be quite important for female volunteers, 
because the typical non profit sectors (health, education and social services) generally have a 
higher  share  of  female  employment  in  the  profit  sector.  Menchik  and  Weisbrod  (1987) 
include the activity sectors in their analysis but Banks and Tanner (1998) show that these 
variables weaken the relation between wage and working hours supplied. The latter evidence 
suggests  that  volunteers  take  their  volunteering  choices,  based  on  the  ability  to  bear  the 
associated cost, which may be different from sector to sector (Govekar and Govekar, 2002). 
Summing up, more research is needed about the implications of overlapping motivations of 
consumption and investment, taking into account the role of intrinsic motivation. Moreover, 
household duties and the activity sector one is engaged in could help to explain the behaviour 
of volunteers. 
3. The model 
Following  the  classification  of  Meier  and  Stutzer  (2008),  people  may  volunteer  for 
intrinsic reasons (social preferences, work enjoyment) and/or for extrinsic reasons (human 
capital and social network investment); these motivations may affect the degree of satisfaction 
generated  by  the  activity  itself.    By  introducing  the  role  of  motivations  in  a  volunteer’s 
choice, the behavioural distinction between investment and consumption may be resumed in 
the  following  working  hypothesis:  while  consumption  choices  are  driven  by  intrinsic 
motivation (the purpose is to consume the good “volunteering” by itself), investment choices 
are driven by extrinsic motivation (volunteering is instrumental to other purposes). In the 
consumption behaviour, intrinsic motivation represents both the social preferences attitude 
and  the  (selfish)  work  enjoyment  component.  In  the  investment  perspective,  individuals   7 
engage in volunteer work to raise future income that, as in previous literature (e.g. Menchik 
and Weisbrod, 1987), is represented by a future wage rate.  
The agent maximises a two period utility function (t=0,1) to determine his paid labour 
supply  and  optimal  amount  of  leisure.  In  each  period  the  optimal  amount  of  leisure  is 
allocated  among  activities  for  his  own  satisfaction  (TMt)  and  “other  regarding”  activities 
(TYt). Two kinds of “other regarding” activities can be distinguished: time spent outside the 
family, supplying unpaid work, like in volunteer work (TYte) and time spent taking care of 
family members (TYti). Preferences concerning “other regarding” activities are modelled using 
the following assumption. 
Assumption 1:  , t t j j TY TY =∑ , with j=i,e. 
Assumption 1 implies that, if time spent in “other regarding” activities is an argument of 
the utility function, individual utility depends on the time spent carrying out household duties, 
and  on  the  time  used  for  volunteering  and  the  two  categories  of  time  use  are  perfectly 
substitutable.  
Family needs are described by a household care constraint, whose parameters depend on 
family size, its composition and the age of its members. If h is the time needed for family 
caring, considering that one can purchase care services at price b, the family’s expenditure is 
given by
 
( ) ti b h TY - . 
Intrinsic motivation to engage in activities bearing the others’ satisfaction is represented by 
α=βγ,  where  β  denotes  the  relative  weight,  in  the  agent  utility,  of  spending  time  for  the 
satisfaction  of  others  compared  to  the  time  spent  for  one’s  own  satisfaction  (the  social 
preference component of intrinsic motivation); γ is the weight of the selfish consumption 
motivation  (the  work  enjoyment  component  of  intrinsic  motivation)  compared  to  the 
investment one (1-γ), with 0£γ£1. If consumption motivation is positive, γ>0, time spent in 
other regarding activities will be an argument of utility function (volunteering is a “good” to 
be  consumed);  if  investment  motivation  is  positive  (1>γ),  individual  choice  about 
volunteering will take into account expected future income coming from helping others today.  
Let rt be the wage increase resulting from unpaid work supplied in the previous period, so 
that  r1=  kTY0,e/TX,  (where  TX  is  the  maximum  available  time):  the  investment  returns  in 
period 1 depend on the percentage of time spent in other regarding activities in period 0. The 
parameter k>1 describes the investment productivity, related to the match between agent’s 
skills and the specific activity sector he is engaged in.    8 
The wage increase associated to volunteering is taken into account only if an extrinsic 
motivation is at work: the strength of investment purposes affects the agent’s confidence in a 
higher future wage rate. In the budget constraint, the agent considers availability of higher 
earnings in period 1 (resulting from unpaid work performed in period 0) with a subjective 
probability given by his extrinsic motivation, while the intrinsic motivation is the probability 
he assigns to the event that no further return will derive from unpaid work. This statement is 
represented in Assumption 2. 
Assumption 2: Motivation shapes the subjective expectation of future wage increase E(rt): 
the  agent  will  expect  rt=0  with  probability  γ  and  rt=f(TYt-1,e)  with  probability  1-γ.  As  a 
consequence, E(rt) =(1-γ)f(TYt-1,e).  
With an intertemporal Cobb Douglas function, agent utility is described by (1). 
      ( ) ( )
1
t
t t t t U CTM TY
d bg bg -   =   Õ                     (1) 
s.t.  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1
t t
t ti t t t t t C b h TY w E r TX TY TM X d d   + - = + - - +   ∑ ∑     (2)
   
where  X  is  non  labour  income,  w  the  wage,  δ    individual  discount  factor  and  Ct  the 
consumption good. 
In this framework, we can test the implications of three alternative settings: if γ=0, the 
agent will engage in TY just for investment motivations; when γ=1 the agent supplies unpaid 
work  only  for  consumption  motives,  while  if  0<γ<1  both  investment  and  consumption 
motivations address individual behaviour. According to the value of γ, utility maximisation 
implies different sets of relevant variables determining volunteering.  
Proposition  1:  For  every  behavioural  model  (for  every  0£γ£1),  unpaid  labour  supply 
depends negatively on family needs of care and wage and positively on non labour income. 
Proof: see Appendix. 
Unpaid labour supply is affected positively by the income effect of non labour income and 
negatively  by  the  substitution  effect  of  wage.  Moreover,  family  needs  of  care  reduce  the 
opportunity set available to volunteer, with a negative effect on unpaid labour supply. 
Proposition 2: In a pure consumption hypothesis (γ=1) unpaid labour supply depends 
positively on intrinsic motivation. In a pure investment hypothesis (γ=0) unpaid labour supply 
depends negatively on discount factor and on investment productivity k.  
Proof: see Appendix.   9 
In a pure consumption model, the equilibrium amount of other regarding activities comes 
from the standard utility maximisation and it depends on the relative weight of the “good” 
volunteering in individual utility (intrinsic motivation), with no role for discount factor and 
investment  productivity  k.  In  the  pure  investment  model,  unpaid  labour  supply  does  not 
depend on intrinsic motivation and it varies with the discount factor: when γ=0, the agent will 
engage in volunteering activities just for investment purposes and the optimal value for TY0,e 
comes from second period income maximisation where the marginal cost of unpaid labour 
must be equal to the discounted value of the marginal benefits it is expected to bring and the 
effect of investment productivity (k) is negative.  
Proposition 3: In the model with simultaneous consumption and investment purposes 
(0<γ<1),  unpaid  labour  supply  depends  on  both  intrinsic  motivation  and  the  discount 
factor. The solution varies with the relative strength of the investment motivation (1-γ).  







- > ,  unpaid  labour  supply  has  an  ambiguous  sign  with 
respect to discount factor and decreases with investment productivity k. 





- £ , unpaid labour supply increases with discount factor 
and investment productivity k. 
Proof: see Appendix. 
If the intrinsic motivation is low (a), the investment purpose will prevail and the agent will 
choose unpaid labour supply in order to equate the marginal benefit deriving from investing in 
volunteering and the cost of care services he economizes by supplying home care by himself.  
If  the  intrinsic  motivation  is  high  (b),  the  consumption  motive  will  prevail  and  the 
opportunity cost associated to time devoted to home life is strictly lower than the opportunity 
cost of volunteer work, performed outside the family.  
Comparing the alternative hypothesis in the mixed model of consumption and investment 
(0<γ<1), it emerges that the k impact on unpaid labour supply is negative if agent has a 
relatively low γ (investment prevailing on consumption purposes) and positive if he has a 
relatively high γ (consumption purposes prevailing). The rationale for these results is that if 
the agent has a strong consumption purpose, he will consider that more productive labour 
increases  the  available  consumption.  On  the  opposite,  if  individual  is  strongly  driven  by 
investment objectives, he will take into account that, ceteris paribus, more productive work 
needs devoting less time to volunteering to gain the same return.   10 
Different values of k, involving different investment productivity, can be associated to the 
specific task undertaken in non profit organizations or to the activity sector one is engaged in. 
Variables  related  to  activity  sector  one  is  engaged  in  may  be  intended  as  a  proxy  of 
investment productivity of volunteering. Moreover, assuming stable preferences over the life 
cycle
2, age can be used as an (inverse) proxy of the discount factor.  
Consequently, according to proposition 2, if a pure consumption model occurs, the choice 
of how much to volunteer will not depend on age and the activity sector, while the intrinsic 
motivation has a positive impact on it.  If unpaid labour supply is directed only by investment 
purposes, it will vary with age and the activity sector, while it will be independent from 
intrinsic motivation. 
Proposition 3 suggests that in the mixed model of consumption and investment, unpaid 
labour supply will vary with intrinsic motivation, age and the activity sector. If consumption 
motives prevail, unpaid labour supply will depend positively on intrinsic motivation and the 
investment  productivity  associated  to  different  activity  sectors  and  negatively  on  age.  If 
investment  purposes  prevail,  a  higher  productivity  sector  has  a  negative  impact  on 
volunteering.  
4. Data 
To test the different implications of consumption and investment purposes in determining 
unpaid labour supply,  we use data from the 1997 wave of the Indagine Multiscopo sulle 
Famiglie,  Aspetti  della  Vita  Quotidiana  (literally,  a  Multipurpose  Households  Survey  on 
everyday  life issues),  a  cross-sectional survey  yearly  administered by  the  Italian National 
Statistical Office (ISTAT). The survey provides micro-level information on several aspects of 
everyday life and behaviour of the Italian population. The sampling unit is the household, and 
the information is available both at the family level and at the level of each component. This 
last sampling unit is used in the present paper. 
The 1997 questionnaire asked individuals over thirteen years old whether they performed 
activities  without  remuneration  in  the  last  12  months  in  non  profit  organisations.  An 
additional set of questions is scheduled for those who answered positively. In particular they 
were asked how many times they carry out these tasks in a week or in a month and why they 
                                                 
2 Evidence for a stable preference about volunteering is in Apinunmahahul and Devlin (2008), showing that the 
past behaviour (volunteering) of individuals is important in determining current behaviour.   11 
chose  to  do  that.  By  deleting  observations  with  missing  data,  the  sample  includes  2617 
volunteers aged 18 to 64, who actively participate in the labour market. Data concerning 
individual, social and economic characteristics of the volunteers is used. 
The selection of variables is based on the theoretical analysis developed in the previous 
Section, as well as on existing literature on volunteering, social capital and data availability. 
Table 2 lists the name and definition of all variables used in the econometric analysis, while 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample.  
The  dependent  variable  is  based  on  the  question  about  unpaid  work  attendance:  the 
“regular volunteering” dummy has value 1 if the respondent provides volunteer work ‘one or 
more times a week’, 0 if he volunteers ‘more than once a month or more rarely’. Table 3 
shows that, on average, 35 percent of the labour force regularly supplies unpaid work in 
volunteering activities.  
As  regards  independent  variables,  the  analysis  uses  data  supposed  to  be  relevant  in 
determining regular volunteering, according to previous discussion. As a proxy for intrinsic 
motivations, the answers to the multiple choice question “Why did you choose to collaborate 
with  an  association  or  volunteering  group?”  have  been  used.  Tree  motivations  could  be 
selected among: (i) No specific reason, it happened just by chance; (ii) I seemed to make life 
worth leaving; (iii) Working together is a value by itself; (iv) I like to keep in touch with 
people; (v) I work with people similar to me and I feel at ease; (vi) Work is well-organized 
and effort is constant; (vii) One counts more and is more considered by institutions; (viii) I 
make something useful; (ix) It is a religious choice. Frequency, mean and standard deviation 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of answer categories 
Answer          Frequency  Mean  Std. Dev 
1) It happened just by chance  302  0.11  0.32 
2) I seemed to make life worth leaving  518  0.21  0.41 
3) Working together is a value by itself  586  0.21  0.41 
4) I like to keep in touch with people  695  0.25  0.43 
5) I work with people similar to me and I feel at ease  339  0.12  0.33 
6) Work is well-organized and effort is constant  88  0.03  0.18 
7) One counts more and is more considered by 
institutions 
74  0.03  0.18 
8) I make something useful  1307  0.49  0.50 
9) It is a religious choice  492  0.21  0.41 
Note: The sum is greater than observed because respondents were allowed to report more than one answer. 
 
The answer “working together is a value by itself” seems to fit the psychological definition 
by Deci et al. (2008), where intrinsic motivation directs individual behaviour toward a goal 
that is not instrumental to another goal. Moreover, this motivation is intrinsic both to the 
individual and the activity performed. The answers 4, 5, 6, and 7 in Table 1 clearly highlight 
instrumental purposes, such as the consumption of relational goods
3 or the need for a political 
voice. The answers 2 and 8 contain the “warm glow” idea of Andreoni (1990) or the social 
preferences framework. These answers represent something intrinsic to the individual but not 
to  the  activity  of  volunteering  by  itself
4.  Consequently,  we  adopt  the  more  restrictive 
definition from the psychological literature and the variable describing intrinsic motivation is 
equal to 1 if the respondents chose the answer “working together is a value by itself”, 0 
otherwise. Average value in Table 2 indicates that 21 percent of frequent volunteers chose 




                                                 
3 The relational motive for volunteer work is analysed by Prouteau and Wolff (2008). 
4 For a discussion on the implications of motivations intrinsic to the individual and/or to the activity see Bruno 
(2010).   13 
Table 2. Variables description  
Variable  Description 
Dependent variable   
“Regular” volunteering  Dummy, 1 if individual supplies unpaid labour one or more times a week ; 0 otherwise 
   
Personal characteristics   
Female  Dummy, 1 if female; 0 otherwise 
Married  Dummy, 1 if married ; 0 otherwise 
Age18-24  Dummy, 1 if age is between 18 and 24; 0 otherwise.  Reference group 
Age25-34  Dummy, 1 if age is between 25 and 34; 0 otherwise 
Age35-44  Dummy, 1 if age is between 35 and 44; 0 otherwise 
Age45-54  Dummy, 1 if age is between 45 and 54; 0 otherwise 
Age55-64  Dummy, 1 if age is between 55 and 64; 0 otherwise 
Age>64  Dummy, 1 if age is equal to 65 and above; 0 otherwise 
Primary school  Dummy, 1 if no school or primary school; 0 otherwise 
Junior High school  Dummy, 1 if compulsory education, 0 otherwise 
High school  Dummy, 1 if high school graduates, 0 otherwise.  Reference group 
University  Dummy, 1 if university degree and doctorate, 0 otherwise.   
Household income (ln)  Natural logarithm of total monthly household income obtained by taking the mean of  the categories 
Employee  Dummy, 1 if individual is employed as an employee, 0 otherwise.  Reference group 
Entrepreneur  Dummy, 1 if individual is employed as an entrepreneur, 0 otherwise 
Self-employed  Dummy, 1 if individual is employed as a self-employed, 0 otherwise 
Private sector  Dummy, 1 if individual is employed in the private sector; 0 otherwise 
   
Intrinsic motivation   Dummy, 1 if “working together is a value per se", 0 otherwise 
   
Family duties   
Family size   Number of people who live in the family 
Children0_5  Dummy, 1 if the individual has children aged between 0 and 5 years; 0 otherwise 
Children6_15  Dummy, 1  if the individual has children aged between 6 and 15 years;  0 otherwise 
Family services  Dummy, 1 if the family takes advantage of baby sitter and / or person to assist elderly, 0 otherwise 
   
Volunteer activities   
Education  Dummy, 1 if  individual  performs unpaid labour in the education sector, 0 otherwise 
Health care  Dummy,  1  if  individual  performs  unpaid  labour  in  the  activities  of  nursing,  therapeutic  and  health  care;  0 
otherwise 
Social services  Dummy, 1 if individual performs unpaid labour in the activities of services of social rehabilitation and / or 
listening, reception, private consultations, 0 otherwise 
Generic help  Dummy, 1 if individual performs unpaid labour in the activity of generic help, 0 otherwise 




Good health  Dummy, 1 if individual sees himself in a good state of health; 0 otherwise 
Homeowner  Dummy, 1 if individual owns the house where he lives; 0 otherwise 
Newspapers  Dummy, 1 if individual reads newspapers every day of the week; 0 otherwise 
Thefts  Dummy, 1 if individual has suffered thefts; 0 otherwise 
Pickpockets  Dummy, 1 if individual has suffered pickpockets; 0 otherwise 
Parking  Dummy, 1 if individual declares that there is not difficulty in parking in the area where he lives; 0 otherwise 
Traffic  Dummy, 1 if individual declares that there is not traffic in the area where he lives; 0 otherwise 
Pollution  Dummy, 1 if individual declares that there is not pollution in the area where he lives; 0 otherwise   14
Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev 
“Regular” volunteering  2617  0.35  0.48 
Female  2617  0.37  0.48 
Married  2617  0.59  0.49 
Age18-24  2617  0.10  0.30 
Age25-34  2617  0.30  0.46 
Age35-44  2617  0.32  0.46 
Age45-54  2617  0.22  0.42 
Age55-64  2617  0.06  0.23 
Primary school  2617  0.06  0.24 
Junior high school  2617  0.28  0.45 
High school  2617  0.48  0.50 
University  2617  0.18  0.38 
Household income (ln)  2537  14.89  0.51 
Entrepreneur  2617  0.17  0.38 
Self-employed  2617  0.05  0.23 
Private sector  2617  0.33  0.47 
Intrinsic motivation  2617  0.21  0.41 
Family size  2617  3.38  1.19 
Children0_5  2617  0.15  0.41 
Children6_15  2617  0.41  0.69 
Family services  2575  0.03  0.17 
Education  2617  0.11  0.32 
Health care  2617  0.08  0.26 
Social services  2617  0.06  0.24 
Generic help  2617  0.16  0.37 
Good health  2594  0.52  0.50 
Homeowner  2608  0.74  0.44 
Newspapers  2613  0.36  0.48 
Thefts  2617  0.02  0.24 
Pickpockets  2617  0.02  0.16 
Parking  2607  0.47  0.50 
Traffic  2601  0.27  0.44 
Pollution  2609  0.28  0.45 
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As proxy for household duties, questions regarding the family size, the age of children and 
the use of family services have been selected (Table 2). In Table 3, it is interesting to note 
that, on average, households have more than 3 members and nearly half of the sample has 
children aged between 6 and 15 years. The use of family services is quite low. 
In addition, five age dummies and four dummies of education are listed in Table 2. Table 3 
shows  that  the  most  numerous  group,  32  percent,  is  aged  35  to  44,  while  the  group  of 
individuals aged 25 to 34 is 30 percent of the sample. Almost half of the sample has high 
school education, while 18 percent has university degree or doctorate. 
Multiscopo survey does not contain data on respondents’ labour income; for the year 1997, 
households’ monthly income is available, with a sixteen categories classification, the lowest 
being the equivalent of less than €155, the highest of more than €4,131. Following Freeman 
(1997), we use the mean of each interval as a measure of family income. Most of the literature 
on volunteering take family income as an exogenous variable. Prouteau and Wolff (2006) and 
Hackl  et  al.  (2007)  consider  the  endogeneity  problem  of  labour  income  with  ambiguous 
results. We take family income as exogenous, being confident that the effect of volunteering 
on  household  income  could  be  assumed  as  negligible  because:  i)  the  question  about 
volunteering explicitly asks for “free activity”, i.e. without remuneration; ii) we consider only 
volunteers that are elsewhere employed; iii) family income includes also non-labour income 
and from other family members. 
Furthermore, data contained in Multiscopo survey supply information about the specific 
activity carried out in the non profit organisations. Four dummies of activity, described in 
Table 2, have been included in the analysis. The aim is to understand whether the activity 
sector (education, health care, social services or generic help) plays a role in unpaid labour 
setting, regularly supplied. Differences among the four dummies of activity are not negligible 
(Table 3). 
Finally, we include a full set of variables accounting for other individual and community 
characteristics, such as, marital status, health, homeowner, newspapers, living area, traffic, 
pollution, and others.  
 
5. Empirical analysis   16
In this Section, we test the theoretical results of Section 3 with a sample selection model. A 
selection bias occurs when considering only those who supply unpaid labour regularly in 
volunteering  organizations,  without  considering  the  threshold  of  non-volunteering  to 
volunteering.  
In our framework, the equations that determine the sample selection are:  
,
*
i i i u W Z + = g 1 = i Z  if  0
* > i Z and 0 otherwise 
and the equation of primary interest is:                                                                   (3) 
  ,
*
i i i e X V + = b 1 = i V  if  1 = i Z and 0 otherwise 
Where 
*
i Z represents individual i’s utility gain from volunteering, 
*
i V is the utility coming 
from regular volunteering,  i W  and  i X  are vectors of explanatory variables, and  i u and  i e  are 
random error terms, with ( i u , i e ) having a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and 
correlation r . 
Consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters of the sample selection model (1) are 
obtained using a two step procedure as discussed in Green (2003) and Wooldridge (2002): 
1.  The  estimates  of  g g g g   are  obtained  estimating  the  probit  equation  by  maximum 
likelihood. For each observation in the selected sample,  ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )/ ( ) i i W W l j g g = F  (inverse Mills 
ratio) is computed. 
2.  The estimates of  b  and  g b are obtained estimating the probit equation by maximum 
likelihood of V on X and  ˆ g . 
In  the  sample  selection  model  (3),  the  vectors  of  explanatory  variables  are  individual 
characteristics, household income, household characteristics, as well as regional dummies
5.           
In what follows, the estimated results of the regression model are discussed
6. In Table 4 
parameter estimations are probit marginal effects calculated on sample means of independent 
variables,  while  standard  errors  (in  parenthesis)  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and 
residual  clustering  at  a  regional  level.  Usual  notation  (*)  denotes  significance  level.  For 
brevity, we report marginal effects for some more relevant variables. 
                                                 
5  The  variable  included  in  the  selection  equation,  but  excluded  from  the  equation  of  primary  interest  (see 
Wooldridge,  2002),  is  the  participation  in  meetings  of  cultural  associations.  Following  Putnam  (1993), 
membership and participation promote coordination, civic culture and social capital. It is reasonable to argue that 
participation in meetings of cultural associations affects the probability to engage in voluntary activities, as 
elements of social capital, both for relational and cultural  motives. On the contrary,  unpaid  work regularly 
performed  is  characterized  by  reiterated  effort,  active  and  personal  involvement  and  is  not  related  to  the 
occasional and passive participation in association meetings. 
6 The estimated results of the sample selection equation are available on request.   17
First of all, intrinsic motivation influences the probability of volunteering “one or more 
times a week” in the expected direction. When we introduce intrinsic motivation variable in 
column (2), the marginal effect is positive and highly significant (1 percent level). Moreover, 
it is stable and highly significant once we bring in family duties variables in column (3). Thus, 
the respondents who indicate that “working together is a value by itself” probably supply 
more frequently unpaid labour than the ones reporting other motivations. The result rejects the 
hypothesis that only investment purposes determine unpaid labour supply.  
Where other variables are concerned, theoretical analysis implies a positive effect of non 
labour income and a negative effect for wage. Unfortunately, we have only data on total 
familial  income.  Nevertheless,  the  estimates  reported  in  Table  4  indicate  that  household 
income has a negative sign on regular volunteering, significant at 5 percent level (column 3). 
Similar results can be found in previous studies on hours volunteered (Day and Devlin, 1996; 
Freeman, 1998). This result could be induced by a prevailing substitution effect, due to labour 
income, on the income effect, due to non labour income. If this interpretation is true, the 
inverse  relation  between  unpaid  work  and  wage  will  support  both  consumption  and 
investment purposes.  
Variables  regarding  family  characteristics  show  marginal  effects  with  expected  sign, 
except for family size. The Children0_5 dummy is negative and highly significant (1 percent 
level) in columns (3). The Children6_15 variable is negative, as expected, but significant at 
10 percent, while the family services variable has the expected sign and significance. As a 
result,  people  with  children  less  frequently  supply  volunteer  activity  than  those  without 
children, and this evidence can be associated to the need to accomplish care tasks. In the same 
way,  people  purchasing  care  services,  less  frequently  supply  volunteer  activity:  family 
services  variable  captures  the  needs  relative  to  the  elderly,  beside  those  of  children.  The 
variables signs thus confirm the inverse relation between unpaid labour and tasks related to 
family care, supporting both consumption and investment model. 
Regarding the family size variable, the marginal effect is positive and significant. Three 
different reasons could explain the positive sign of the variable representing the family size: 
first, a larger family does not always imply more household tasks, as the latter is linked to the 
presence of children or elderly; second, relatives could have a role in promoting volunteering, 
as literature has pointed out; third, other adults in the household could be substitutes for the 
respondent in family caring.  
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Table 4. Marginal effects of the probability of being a regular volunteer   
 
Variables       (1)      (2)      (3) 




  0.033* 
 (0.018) 




  0.008 
 (0.030) 
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 (0.045) 




  0.009 
 (0.025) 




  0.032 
 (0.033) 










  0.109*** 
 (0.019) 
Family size 
   
  0.019** 
 (0.010) 
Children0_5 








   
 -0.135*** 
 (0.034) 






       




















0.31  Predicted  P 
Notes. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has done unpaid labour one or more times a week for official 
volunteer service associations over the last twelve months. The regressors are those in Table 2. The coefficients are marginal 
effects calculated at the sample mean of independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity  and  clustering  of  errors  at  the  regional  level.  The  symbols  ***,  **,  *  denote  that  the  coefficient  is 
statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
Age  dummies  show  an  inverse  relation  with  the  probability  of  undertaking  regular 
volunteering. The dummies referred to people aged over 45 have a negative and significant 
marginal effect, showing that people over 45 years less frequently supply unpaid labour than 
the reference group (aged 18 to 24). With the inclusion of family needs variables in columns   19
(3) the dummies referred to those aged above 45 loose significance, while the findings about 
people aged over 45 are stable. Since we use  cross sectional data, we cannot distinguish 
between age and cohort effect. However, the result is in line with the previous empirical 
studies on hours volunteered, i.e. Brown and Lankford (1992) results, obtained with panel 
data,  and  those  of  Menchik  and  Weisbrod  (1987),  Day  and  Devlin  (1996),  and 
Apinunmahakul and Devlin (2008), using cross sectional data. If we can affirm that the life 
cycle  exhibits  a  down-ward  path,  the  age  dummies  relevance  tends  to  reject  the  pure 
consumption and the pure investment models.    
Summing up, the evidence shown in Table 4 rejects both the pure consumption and the 
pure investment model. On the other hand, the relevance of intrinsic motivation, age dummies 
and household duties suggests that a mixed model of consumption and investment could fit 
well the behaviour of regular volunteers.  
5. the Mixed model:  a robustness analysis   
Theoretical reasoning presented in Section 2 (Proposition 3) suggests that in the mixed 
model  of  investment  and  consumption,  unpaid  labour  supply  will  vary  with  intrinsic 
motivation, age and the activity sector. If consumption motives prevail, unpaid labour supply 
will depend positively on intrinsic motivation and the investment productivity associated to 
the activity sector and negatively on age. If investment purposes prevail, a higher productivity 
sector has a negative impact on volunteering.  
To empirically test the implications of Proposition 3 we introduce activities carried out in 
non profit organisations. According to Freeman (1997), individual human capital affects the 
productivity  of  volunteering,  offsetting  the  relative  higher  opportunity  costs,  but  the 
differences  in  volunteering  among  individual  with  the  same  characteristics  cannot  be 
explained only by the opportunity cost. Moreover, the author pointed out that the specific 
activity the individual is engaged in can explain differences in productivity of time spent in 
volunteering. On the other hand, the specific activity one carries out could be relevant in 
granting opportunities to skilled workers but, at same time, for the non profit organisation, it 
represents an instrument to attract skilled resources (Ranci, 2006). 
According to data availability, more skilled sectors (education, health, social services) will 
be introduced together with an unskilled sector of “generic help”. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 5 
report the results of including dummies of activity sector. The following comments are made   20
on findings reported in column (4). Quantitative relevance of variables influencing regular 
unpaid labour is also reported. 
First of all, the inclusion of new variables does not basically modify estimates of intrinsic 
motivation impact: the marginal effect decreases a little but it is still significant at 1 percent 
level. Therefore, the marginal effect of intrinsic motivation is remarkably robust. 
Secondly, the marginal effect of the dummy Age55-64 is substantially stable, significant at 
1 percent level, and the dummy Age45-54 is not considerably changed by the inclusion of 
supplementary variables, remaining significant at 10 percent level.  
 
Table 5. Marginal effects of the probability of being a regular volunteer: robustness analysis with activity sectors 
dummies  
 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Female   0.022  (0.018)   0.020  (0.018)   0.015  (0.018)   0.013  (0.017) 
Married  -0.002  (0.028)  -0.002  (0.029)   0.003  (0.028)   0.004  (0.029) 
Age25-34  -0.036  (0.028)  -0.034  (0.028)  -0.037  (0.027)  -0.038  (0.027) 
Age35-44  -0.072  (0.046)  -0.067  (0.045)  -0.072  (0.044)  -0.072  (0.045) 
Age45-54  -0.074*  (0.041)  -0.067  (0.040)  -0.072*  (0.039)  -0.073*  (0.039) 
Age55-64  -0.161***  (0.043)  -0.154***  (0.045)  -0.168***  (0.042)  -0.168***  (0.042) 
Primary school   0.036  (0.047)   0.035  (0.048)   0.036  (0.049)   0.035  (0.049) 
Junior high school   0.025  (0.025)   0.025  (0.025)   0.024  (0.024)   0.024  (0.025) 
University   0.012  (0.031)   0.008  (0.031)   0.005  (0.031)   0.005  (0.031) 
Household income (ln)  -0.052**  (0.023)  -0.056**  (0.023)  -0.056**  (0.023)  -0.056**  (0.023) 
Intrinsic motivation   0.097***  (0.017)   0.095***  (0.017)   0.089***  (0.019)   0.089***  (0.018) 
Family size   0.020**  (0.010)   0.021**  (0.010)   0.023**  (0.010)   0.022**  (0.010) 
Children0_5  -0.084***  (0.022)  -0.084***  (0.021)  -0.085***  (0.021)  -0.085***  (0.020) 
Children6_15  -0.025*  (0.015)  -0.027*  (0.015)  -0.028*  (0.015)  -0.027*  (0.015) 
Family services  -0.136***  (0.033)  -0.138***  (0.034)  -0.136***  (0.033)  -0.135***  (0.034) 
Education   0.332***  (0.026)   0.333***  (0.026)   0.328***  (0.026)   0.330***  (0.026) 
Health care       0.152***  (0.033)   0.152***  (0.034)   0.152***  (0.034) 
Social services           0.146***  (0.033)   0.143***  (0.035) 
Generic help               0.023  (0.031) 
Inverse Mills ratio    0.021  (0.023)   0.017  (0.023)   0.018  (0.023)   0.019  (0.023) 
                 



















Observed P  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.32 
Predicted  P  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31 
Notes. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has done unpaid labour one or more times per week for 
official volunteer service associations over the last twelve months. The regressors are those given in Table 2. The coefficients 
are marginal effects calculated at the sample mean of independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  clustering  of  errors  at  the  regional  level.  The  symbols  ***,  **,  *  denote  that  the 
coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
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Thirdly,  the  variables  regarding  household  income  and  family  tasks  are  stable  and 
significant  at  conventional  levels  or  more.  Furthermore,  people  with  small  children  or 
teenagers significantly supply unpaid labour more rarely. Finally, the variables concerning 
activity sector show a positive marginal effect, significant at 1 percent, except for the dummy 
Generic help.  
Using the marginal effect in column 4 (Table 5) we calculate that, starting from the sample 
mean,  an  increase  in  Education  by  one  standard  deviation  leads  to  an  increase  in  the 
probability of regular volunteering of 10 percentage points. This is a sizeable effect compared 
with the impact of other variables. To be a volunteer in the sectors of health care and social 
services  raises  the  propensity  to  supply  regular  unpaid  work,  respectively,  by  4  and  3 
percentage points. Therefore,  these last variables account at most for an half of the Education 
effect. As for household duties variables, a one standard deviation increase in Children0_5, 
Children6_15 and Family services variables reduces the propensity to regular volunteer of 
about 7 percentage points; the same increase in Age55_64 reduces the probability of being 
regular volunteer by about 4 percentage points. 
Summing  up,  the  findings  in  this  Section  indicate  that  regular  unpaid  labour  supply 
depends  positively  on  intrinsic  motivation  and  on  the  activity  sector  specialization  and 
negatively  on  age.  This  evidence  supports  the  hypothesis  that,  in  a  mixed  model  of 
consumption and investment, consumption purposes prevail.  
Evidence on activity sectors also corroborates the hypothesis that skilled activity sector 
could be a good proxy of returns to volunteering. Within each specific sector, unlike what 
happens in the full sample, it emerges a significant negative correlation between education 
dummies  and  the  probability  of  being  a  regular  volunteer,  showing  more  clearly  that  an 
opportunity cost effect is at work within these sectors. This suggests that by analysing the 
volunteers’ behaviour within the subsample of a skilled sector, we remove some difference 
among volunteers’ opportunity sets (their costs or benefits) that exists in the full sample, 
making it clearer the cost effect.  It is reasonable to assume that the full sample contains 
individuals with different returns to volunteering while, within the specific sector, individuals 
facing the same return to volunteering are differentiated only by their opportunity cost. This 
confirms a relationship between returns to volunteering and activity sectors.  
On the other hand, if an alternative explanation would be true, and the specific sector 
would merely represent an instrument for non profit organisation to attract frequent volunteers   22
with  more  specific  skills,  we  would  expect  a  positive  correlation  between  frequent 
volunteering and more educated individuals, but this correlation is rejected by the data. 
7. Accounting for endogeneity of intrinsic motivation 
Empirical  findings  in  Sections  4  and  5  indicate  that  an  intrinsic  motivation  effect  is 
running.  Nevertheless,  intrinsic  motivation  is  potentially  endogenous.  First,  intrinsic 
motivation may increase regular unpaid work, but regular volunteer labour supply may also 
positively influence intrinsic motivation. At the beginning, individuals may be intrinsically 
motivated to do continuative voluntary work. Once involved, the tasks volunteers perform 
may be inherently interesting and as such intrinsically motivating. Moreover, endogeneity 
may also arise from confounding factor, i.e. unobserved variables that are correlated with 
intrinsic motivation. 
In this Section we deal with the possibility of biased estimation on intrinsic motivation 
variable  using  a  probit  model  with  endogenous  variables  (IV  model),  focusing  on  two 
variables that should be plausible instruments, i.e. correlated with intrinsic motivation, but 
with no direct influence on the decision to offer regular unpaid work.  
The first variable is the positive answer to the question “Have you participated in meetings 
of ecological associations?” a dummy with value 1 if the individual participated in meetings 
of ecological associations, 0 otherwise. When dealing with ecological issues, membership and 
meetings participation are aimed at improving environment quality and collective welfare. In 
the  literature  on  pro-environmental  behaviour,  participation  in  meetings  of  ecological 
associations is an environmental attitude and an important determinant of pro-environmental 
behaviour  (van  den  Bergh,  2008).  This  environmental  attitude  could  derive  from  social 
preferences, the need of a “warm glow” or because keeping in touch with environment is 
interesting and enjoyable by itself. All of these alternatives fall into the categories of intrinsic 
motivation  described  in  Section  2
7.  Hence,  it  is  reasonable  to  argue  that  participation  in 
meetings of ecological association is associated with higher intrinsic motivation. On the other 
hand,  unpaid  work  regularly  performed  is  characterized  by  reiterated  effort,  active  and 
personal  involvement.  Consequently,  although  membership  and  meetings  participation  in 
                                                 
7 The same may not be true for cultural, political and professional associations or unions, which are the other 
groups listed in the question. Recreational activities are often hidden under the label of cultural associations.  
Membership to professional association is strictly linked to the working status, as well as union membership. 
Finally, people attending the meetings of political parties may be motivated by collective aims as well as by 
lobby interests.   23
ecological associations can promote coordination and civic culture, it is reasonable to argue 
that these behaviours affect only the probability to engage in voluntary activities, but not the 
intensity of voluntary work.  
 The second variable is based a question on the positive aspects of military service. “Sense 
of  responsibility  as  a  positive  aspect  of  military  service”  is  a  dummy,  with  value  1  if 
respondents  agree  with  the  statement  that  military  service  “develops  a  greater  sense  of 
responsibility  and  personal  autonomy”,  0  otherwise.  This  statement  implies  a  positive 
consideration of responsibility and autonomy and it can be assumed as a signal of a strong 
intrinsic  motivation.  The  reasoning  relies  on  psychological  literature.  In  the  cognitive 
evaluation theory by Deci and Ryan (1985), “…opportunities for self direction were found to 
enhance  intrinsic  motivation  because  they  allow  people  a  greater  feeling  of  autonomy”. 
According to this, volunteers appreciating sense of responsibility developed during military 
service have a higher intrinsic motivation. At the same time, feeling of autonomy seems to be 
uncorrelated with the intensity unpaid labour, because opportunities to  satisfy  a desire of 
independence come from the remuneration available in the standard labour market.  
 
Table 6 – Marginal effects of the probability of being a regular volunteer, endogeneity analysis with instrumental 
variables  
Variable                           IV model 
   
Intrinsic motivation  0.570***     (0.148) 
Inverse Mills ratio  0.053*         (0.030) 
   
Individual and community controls
a  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes 
   
No. obs.  2388 
Log L.hood  -2595.68 
Sargan (p-value)  0.18 
   
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has done unpaid labour one or more times per week for 
official volunteer service associations over the last twelve months. Instruments for intrinsic motivation are participation in 
meetings of ecological associations and sense of responsibility as a positive aspect of military service. Standard errors (in 
brackets) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of residuals at provincial level. The symbols ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
(a) Individual and community controls: all those listed in Table 2. 
 
We  carried  out  a  range  of  diagnostic  tests  to  assess  the  validity  of  these  instruments. 
Looking at (unreported) first stage regression of the intrinsic motivation on “participation in 
meetings  of  ecological  associations”  and  “sense  of  responsibility  as  a  positive  aspect  of 
military service” as well as the remaining exogenous variables from table 4 (column 4), we   24
see that the two instruments are significant at conventional level. We also performed a Sargan 
test of overidentification and fail to reject the null hypothesis that at least one instrument 
instruments is uncorrelated with the structural error. This again seems to support the validity 
of the instruments. Finally, we conducted a Hausman test comparing the coefficients from the 
IV model to those in an uninstrumented probit model. In this case the rank of the differenced 
variance matrix is not equal the number of coefficients being tested and we are unable to rely 
on the Hausman test statistic. However, a Hausman test for only intrinsic motivation indicates 
that  the  two  models  are  statistically  significantly  different.  Taken  as  a  whole,  the  results 
suggest that it may be necessary to endogenize intrinsic motivation and we believe that we 
have appropriates instrument for doing so.    
Table 5 presents the results of IV model for frequent unpaid work. Since the point is to test 
the endogeneity of intrinsic motivation, we report only the instrumental estimate for intrinsic 
motivation.  The  intrinsic  motivation  variable  is  highly  positively  associated  with  regular 
unpaid work and its marginal effect considerably increases, with respect to results of Table 5 
(column 4). Remarkably, we can also observe that the bias leads to underestimation of the 
absolute size of the marginal effects of interest. As a consequence,  as  expected, intrinsic 
motivation does have a significant positive effect on regular volunteer labour. Estimate in 
Table 6 shows that intrinsic motivation is very important in volunteers’ behaviour: starting 
from the sample mean, with a one standard deviation increase of intrinsic motivation variable, 
the  frequent  unpaid  labour  will  increase  by  23  percent  in  the  labour  force.  The  intrinsic 
motivation effect is twice the effect of being volunteer in education sector, three times the 
effect of variables concerning household duties, and five times the effect of volunteering in 
health  care  sector.  Finally,  estimate  in  Table  6  confirms  the  result  on  the  relevance  of  
intrinsic motivation obtained by Fiorillo (2011) using hours volunteered. 
7. Conclusions 
Economic theory explains the supply of volunteering alternatively as an ordinary consumer 
good or an investment one. From the empirical point of view, this alternative implies that 
income and age are the relevant variables to distinguish between the two approaches. Starting 
from  the  seminal  paper  of  Menchik  and  Weisbrod,  literature  reports  conflicting  results, 
supporting either one or the other hypothesis, so that “there is evidence that both consumption 
and  investment  motivations  influence  the  supply  of  volunteer  labour”  (Menchik  and   25
Weisbrod,  1987,  p.  180).  The  need  of  a  theoretical  framework  allowing  a  simultaneous 
approach that would consider both motivations is accomplished in this paper. We develop a 
model of unpaid labour supply by using the psychological distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations, as suggested by numerous authors emphasizing the role of intrinsic 
motivation, altruism and pro social behaviour in shaping volunteering. Theoretical findings 
are tested for Italy, by using Istat’s 1997 Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie, Aspetti della 
Vita  Quotidiana  (Multipurpose  Households  Survey  on  everyday  life  issues).  Focusing  on 
regularly  supplied  unpaid  labour,  data  reject  the  hypothesis  that  only  a  consumption  or 
investment motive could explain Italian volunteers’ behaviour, supporting the hypothesis that 
both investment and consumption motives interact in shaping regular unpaid labour supply. 
According to the simultaneity hypothesis, empirical findings show that intrinsic motivation, 
age, household income, familial duties and the specific sector where an individual is engaged 
in are relevant variables in shaping volunteering. These findings corroborate a mixed model 
of consumption and investment where consumption purposes prevail on the investment ones. 
Robustness analysis and endogeneity test for intrinsic motivation confirm the most relevant 
results. Consequently, the present study extends the results for Italy of Cappellari et al. (2007) 
and  Fiorillo  (2009)  to  regular  unpaid  work,  highlighting  the  central  role  of  intrinsic 
motivation and the relevance of family needs and activity sector.     26
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
1.  Pure consumption model:  g=1 
Given (1) and (2), the following Lagrangianian can be written.  
( ) {
( ) ( ) }
1 (1 )
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
( )
i e i e
i e e i i
Z C TM TY TY CTM TY TY C C bh X
w b TY w TX TY TM w TX TY TY TM bTY
b b d b db l d d
d d
- -   = + + - + + - +  
+ - - - - - - - - -
 
Utility maximization implies a corner solution for the optimal values of TY0e and TY0i.  
TY0i, with the lower opportunity cost (w-b) is fixed to the maximum available amount TY0i=h 
and TY0e derives from the difference between total amount of other regarding time and h. 
   
TY0e =
b wTX + X ( )
2- b ( )w
- h                  (1.A) 
 
with 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0;       0;       0;        0;       0;      0;
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2. Pure investment model: g=0 
Without  any  consumption  motivation,  time  spent  in  other  regarding  activities  has  no 
impact on individual utility. With no other benefit beside the wage increase, TY0i and TY1j will 
be set equal to zero.  
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Derivative of Z with respect to TY0e implies that the marginal cost of volunteering (w) 








. Because the brackets expression is 
lower than 1, this condition holds if δk>1. This condition implies that the agent engages in 
volunteering if the first volunteering unit has a lower cost than the discounted gain he can get 
with the first labour unit supplied in period 1. The following optimal value for volunteering 
derives.   30
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with 
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  It  is  worthwhile  to  note  that  in  the  pure  investment  model  a  positive  amount  of 
volunteering  occurs  if  a  participation  constraint  is  verified.  An  individual  will  engage  in 
unpaid activity if he is at least as well off as he would have been if he hasn't participated. 
Therefore, the optimal consumption available by investing in volunteering must be greater 
than  the  corresponding  value  without  volunteering.  This  implies  that: 
( ) ( ) 2 0 k X bh wTX k d d - - - > . 
3. Mixed model of investment and consumption: 0<g<1 
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FOCs for TY0e and TY0i are, respectively: 
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The two FOCs have the same left hand side. By comparing the right hand, two situations 
have to be distinguished. 
3.1. Prevailing consumption 
 If 













, being the value in  parenthesis lower 
than one, and rearranging: 







 (1-g ) TX -TY 1 -TM1 ( )> w- b
 
 
The opportunity cost of time spent for family needs is strictly lower than the opportunity 
cost  of  volunteering.  The  equilibrium  amount  of  volunteering  is  determined  in  a  corner   31
solution  as  in  the  pure  consumption  model:  TY0i=h  and  TY0e  derives  from  the  difference 
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3.2. Prevailing investment 
If 




,  working time at period 1 can be settled in order to equate the two RHSs of 
the  FOCs,  that  is 
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.  By  substituting  the 
condition 
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 = b and the other FOCs in the budget constraint, one 
obtains: 
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where 
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while the sign of variations with respect to factor discount is ambiguous. 
 
 